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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE ROAD COMl\,1ISSION OF UTAH,
Petitioner,
-vsurrAH POWER & LIGHT CO., a corporation; MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY
CO., a corporation; and MOUNTAIN
STATES TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO., a corporation,
Respondents.

1

l

I
Case No. 9136

PETI'riON FOR REHEARING

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On May 26, 1960, the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah affirmed a Summary Judgment rendered in the
Third Judicial District Court in favor of Respondents and
declared as constitutional Chapter 53, Laws of Utah 1957,
commonly referred to hereinafter as the Utility Relocation
Act, codified as Section 27-2-7(22) (a), U.C.A. 1953, as
amended.
It is submitted and alleged that, in respect to the constitutional issues raised, the Court was in error. Further,
even were such statute assumed constitutional, problems
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in the interpretation and construction of said Act persist,
making application thereof impossible without further clarification and amplification of the Supreme Court decision
as written.
For these reasons and because of the far reaching consequences of the decision as rendered, the State Road
Commission of Utah herewith petitions the Court to rehear the immediate matter based on the facts and points
set forth hereinafter.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Federal Highway Act of 1956 provides as follows:
"When a State shall pay for the cost of relocation
of utility facilities necessitated by the construction
of a project on the Federal-aid primary or secondary systems or on the Interstate System, including
extensions thereof within urban areas, Federal
funds may be used to reimburse the State for such
cost in the same proportion as Federal funds are
expended on the project. Federal funds shall not
be used to reimburse the State under this section
when the payment to the utility violates the law of
the State or violates a legal contract between the
utility and the State. * * *" (Emphasis added).
(23 u.s.c. 123).
Subsequent to the Federal Act, the Utah Legislature
by Laws of Utah 1957, Chapter 53, passed the following
act to take effect May 14, 1957:
"The Commission [State Road Commission] shall
have the following powers and duties:

***

(22) (a) To make reasonable regulations for the
installation, construction, maintenance, repair, renewal and relocation of all facilities and drainage
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and irrigation systems (herein called 'facilities')
of any utility in, on, along, over, across, through,
or under any project on the federal-aid primary or
secondary systems of highways as the same now
are or may hereafter be defined by Act of Congress,
or on the interstate system, as herein defined, including extensions thereof within urban areas.
Whenever the commission shall determine that it
is necessary that any such facilities which now are,
or hereafter may be, located in, on, along, over,
across, through or under any such federal-aid primary or secondary system or on the interstate system, including extensions thereof within urban
areas, should be relocated, the utility or political
subdivision owning or operating such facilities
shall relocate the same in accordance with the order
of the commission; provided, however, that the cost
of relocation in connection with the highway systems as defined in this paragraph, shall be paid by
,the commission in all cases where proportionate
reimbursement of such cost may be obtained by the
state of Utah from the United States pursuant to
the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956. In case of
any such relocation of facilities, as aforesaid, the
utility or political subdivision owning or operating
the same, its successors or assigns, may maintain
and operate such facilities, with the necessary appurtenances, in the new location or locations."
(Emphasis added).
(Section 27-2-7 (22) (a), U.C.A. 195·3, as amended).
In approximately June, 1957, the State Road Commission requested each of the respondents herein to relocate
certain facilities situated within public right of way to
facilitate highway construction in connection with federal
aid road building projects. In each case the utility demanded that the State Road Commission pay the relocation costs
incurred. In each case the utility occupied the right-of-way
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by virtue of a franchise agreement with the political subdivision involved.
The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company had been given a fifty year franchise from December
29, 1947, by Davis County to occupy certain portions of a
county road known as Howard Street. Though the franchise agreement stipulated that the Company would be
subject to all lawful exercise of the police power by the
county, nothing was said therein as to relocation costs.
(See Exhibit A.)
The Mountain Fuel Supply Company had been granted a fifty year franchise from October 27, 1953, by Salt
Lake City to occupy certain portions of 7th East Street.
Though this franchise agreement likewise stipulated that
the Company would at all times during the life of the franchise be subject to all lawful exercise of the police power
by the City, nothing was said therein as to relocation costs.
(See Exhibit B.)
The Utah Power and Light Company had been given
a fifty year franchise from January 1, 1951, by Salt Lake
City to occupy certain portions of Sixth West Street.
Though this franchise agreement stipulated that all lines,
poles, towers, conduits and other structures constructed
under the grant should be located as to cause minimum
interference with the proper use of such streets, alleys and
public places, nothing was said as to relocation costs. (See
Exhibit C.)
On advice of the Attorney General, the Road Commission refused to pay the relocation costs demanded by
the respondents, and this action was brought by the. ComSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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mission under the provisions of the Declaratory Judgments
Act, Chapter 33, Title 78, U.C.A. 1953, to determine the
constitutionality of the Utility Relocation Act and the obligation of the State Road Commission thereunder. The
District Court held the Utility Relocation Act to be constitutional and ordered the State Road Commission to reimburse the respondent utilities for their relocation costs.
This Court then affirmed by its decision of May 26, 1960.
S'f A TEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE USE BY THE RESPONDENTS OF PUBLIC
HIGHWAY RIGHT-OF-WAY IN THE EMPLACEMENT OF THEIR FACILITIES DOES NOT
CONST~ITUTE A USE PUBLIC IN NATURE SO
AS TO VOID THE OPERATION OF ARTICLE
VI, SECTION 31 OFI THE UTAI-I CONSTITUTION.
POINT II
THE PERMISSIVE USE OF THE PUBLIC
HIGHWAY RIGHT-OF'-WAY BY THE UTILITY IN EMPLACING ITS FACILITIES THEREON DOES NOT VEST IN IT A PROPERTY
RIGHT OF ANY NATURE.
POINT III
NEITHER THE UTILITY RELOCATION ACT
NOR THE DECISION AS RENDERED IMPOSES
AN OBLIGATION UPON THE STATE ROAD
COMMISSION TO REIMBURSE RELOCATION
COSTS IN CONTRAVENTI ON OF THE SPECIFIC TERMS OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UTILITY AND THE STATE ROAD
COMMISSION.
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POINT IV
TO THE CONTRARY THE UTILITY R·ELOCATION ACT SPECIFICALLY PROTECTS ·TH·E
OBLIGA·TION OF CONTRACT AND ABSOLVES
THE STATE ROAD COMMISSION FROM RELOCATION COSTS WHERE BY WRITING, SUCH
OBLIGA·TION HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN ASSUMED BY THE UTILI1:,Y.
POINT V
THE UTILITY RELOCATION ACT IS, BY ITS
VERY TERMS, DEVISABLE AND THE PROVISO
REGARDING RELOCATION COSTS DOES NOT
QUALIFY OR EFFECT THE PLENARY POWER
GRANTED TO THE STATE ROAD COMMISSION
TO REGULATE, CONTROL AND RELOCATE
FACILITIES LOCATED ON A PUBLIC RIGHTOF-WAY.
POINT VI
THE PERMISSIVE USE GRANTED TO A UTILITY OF THE PUBLIC HIGHWAYS DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE A USE AS NECESSARY AND
INDISPENSABLE AS THE USE OF SUCH
HIGHWAY AS A MEDIUM FOR VEHICULAR
TRAFFIC.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE USE BY THE RESPONDENTS OF PUBLIC
HIGHWAY RIGHT-OF-WAY IN THE EMPLACEMENT OF THEIR FACILITIES DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE A USE PUBLIC IN NATURE SO
AS TO VOID THE OPE,RATION OF ARTICLE
VI, SE,CTION 31 O·F THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
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It was the contention of the State of Utah heretofore,
and it shall continue to be the State's contention herein,
that to allow the specific statute, 27-2-7(22), U.C.A. 1953, as
amended, to finance the cost of placing and relocating the
facilities of privately owned utilities on the highway rightof-way of the State of Utah and the cost, to a large extent,
of the facilities themselves at public expense, is to fly into
the face of the constitutional mandate prohibiting the lending of public credit to a private instrumentality. If it be
admitted, and we believe that it has so been and is, that
the respondents are engaged in private enterprise, that
their assets are acquired through the medium of capital
subscription and contribution from private sources, that
a primary purpose thereof is to realize a net return on invested capital, that private individuals receive payments
in the form of dividends from the respondents based on net
profits and in proportion to representative interests, that
to some extent the respondents compete among themselves
for customers and new business, and that they are private
and independent instrumentalities devoted to profit-making ventures while performing their services, then without
reservation it may be said that a contribution of public
moneys for the respondents' use in the furtherance of their
businesses, absent a basis in contractual obligation or legal
indebtedness, contravenes the import of the Constitution.
It is agreed without exception by all parties hereto
that a utility, exclusive of legislation to the contrary, placing its facilities on the public streets and highways, gains
no property rigbt thereby, and upon demand of the public
authority, pursuant to lawful and reasonable exercise of
the police power, it must remove the facility at its own
expense and cost. New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage
Commission, 197 U.S. 453, 25 S. Ct. 471, 49 L.Ed. 831; State
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of' Idaho v. Idaho Power Co. and the Mountain States Tele~
phone and Telegraph Co., -Ida.-, 346 P.2d 596 (1959);
New York City Tunnel Authority v. Consolidated Edison
Co. of New York, 295 N.Y. 467, 68 N.E.2d 445; State Highway Commission of New Mexico v. Southern Union Gas
Co., 65 N.Mex. 84, 332 P.2d 1007; State of Tennessee v.
Southern Bell Telephone Co., 319 S.W.2d 90 (Tenn.); Bell
Telephone Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission,
12 A.2d 479 (Pa.). The majority opinion in the instant case
accepts this observation as accurate. Nothing by way of
a vested property interest accrues to the utility by reason
of the. franchise voluntarily given it by the state, nor does
the state suffer any obligation or indebtedness to the company in permitting it to utilize the public right-of-way. The
risk of removing and relocating the facilities rests at the
feet of the company under the classic rule recognized in
virtually all jurisdictions of "damnum absque injuria."
New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Commission of New
Orleans, supra; State of Idaho v. Idaho Power Co. and
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., supra. By
this fact that· the utility acquires no property interest in
and to the public right-of-way, the requirement by the state
government to remove and relocate the facilities does not
constitute or qualify as a taking within the eminent domain
clause of the Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 22, or statutes, 7834-1- et seq, but rather remains constant as a proper police
power regulation. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. The
City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 34 S. Ct. 364, 58 L.Ed. 721.
It is safe to say that the common law may be ~odified~
altered or changed by the Legislature, and with this proposition we have no quarrel; we would but add thereto, that
as a .condition precedent to such alteration, modification
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or change, the statute comply with the elements of constitutional law in all respects and that a failure to adhere to
such must result in it being stricken as invalid.
This Court, in its opinion, set forth a list of cases allegedly to have dealt with or passed on the constitutionality of similar legislation under simular constitutional
provisions. With due respect, we would argue that the
weight of authority is by no means in favor of the respondents' contentions, and further, we would allege that several of the cases cited by the Court have no application or
relevancy to the case at bar.
To begin with, the Court cites the Opinion of the Justices, 132 A.2d 440 (Me. 1957). The rule is well recognized
in those jurisdictions wherein the Justices of a court may
be called upon to advise as to the constitutionality of proposed legislation, that any opinion delivered in such advisory capacity does not constitu~e an official judicial
decision of the highest court and any question brought
forth or considered under such an opinion may be litigated
at a subsequent time without being barred by the doctrine
of res adjudicata. In no sense does the proceeding partake
of an adversary nature and opposing arguments are not
formally presented. Martin v. Maine Saving Bank, 147 A.2d
137 (Me.); Opinion of Justices, 76 N.H. 597, 74 A. 490.
The appropriateness of this decision is well taken in
connection with the interpretation of Section (e) of the
statute under consideration, which reads in part:
"The cost of relocating utility facilities in connection with any project on the Federal-Aid primary
or secondary systems or on the Interstate System
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is hereby declared to be a cost of highway construction." (Emphasis added).
The Justices, in commenting upon the section above quoted, stated:
''We do not commonly consider that a power company in erecting a pole line or a water district in
laying a pipe in a highway is constructing a highway. To an even lesser degree would we consider
the construction of a pole or a water pipe across
country to be the construction or reconstruction of
a highway, although the reason for the relocation
was occasioned solely by changes in the highway."
It cannot be refuted, therefore, that in analyzing Section
(e) of 27-2-7(22), U.C.A. 1953, as amended, that the Maine
opinion is authority for the principles advocated herein
by the State of Utah.
T'he case of Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. v. the State
Road Commission of Maryland, 214 Md. 266, 134 A.2d 312,
cited by this Court, did not involve the constitutionality
of any statute nor were any constitutional questions raised
by either party therein. Since the immediate case under
consideration is directed solely to the constitutionality of
legislation, we deem and do allege the Maryland decision
not deserving of consideration.
The majority opinion further cites the Opinion of the
Justices of New Hampshire, 132 A.2d 613 (N.H. 1957), as
authority on the subject. We respectfully submit that it
takes little time to reveal that the Justices of New Hampshire, in their opinion, considered constitutional problems
quite unlike that which exist in Utah, for the New Hampshire Constitution is absent of any directive prohibiting the
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sovereign state from lending its credit to private instrume'!Ltalities or to finance private undertakings. The Justices
therein held that if the Legislature decided to alter the
common law, it would not be in violation of its constitution,
Part 2, Art. 5th, or Part 1, Art. lOth.
The respondents herein cited these sections of the New
Hampshire Constitution in their original brief submitted.
I is interesting to view the contents of said sections in
comparison with the clear mandate of Article VI, Section
31 of the Utah Constitution:
"Pt. 2, Art. 5th. And further, full power and authority are hereby given and granted to the said
general court, from time to time, to make, ordain,
and establish, all manner of wholesome and reasonable orders, laws, statutes, ordinances, directions,
and instructions, either with penalties, or without,
so as the same be not repugnant or contrary to this
constitution, as they may judge for the benefit and
welfare of this state, and for the governing and
ordering thereof, and of the subjects of the same,
for the necessary support and defense of the government thereof, * * * provided that the general
court shall not authorize any town to loan or give
its money or credit directly or indirectly for the
benefit of any corporation having for its object a
dividend of profits or in any way aid the same by
taking its stock or bonds. Fror the purpose of encouraging conservation of the forest resources of
the state, the general court may provide for special
assessments, rates and taxes on growing wood and
timber." (Emphasis added).
"Pt. 1, Art. lOth. Government being instituted for
the common benefit, protection, and security, of the
whole community, and not for the private interest
or emolument of any one man, family, or class of
men; therefore, whenever the ends of government
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are perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the people may, and of right ought to reform the old, or establish a new government. The
doctrine of nonresistance against arbitrary power,
and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive
of the good and happiness of mankind."
(New Hampshire State Constitution)
Part 2, Art. 5th prohibits a town from loaning its
money or credit to any corporation issuing dividends based
on profits, but it exempts from its operation the sovereign
state or any other political subdivision, and under the well
settled and accepted rule of construction, expressio unius
e~t exclusio alterius (Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 19
L.Ed. 1868), the State or the State Road Commission would
be specifically excluded from its operation. The fact that
the Justices of New Hampshire had not a constitutional
provision parallel to that of Art. VI, Sec. 31 of the Utah
Constitution before them for construction renders this
opinion valueless in the present determination.
The same objection is found in the case of Wilson v.
Longbranch, 142 A.2d 837 (New Jers~y), which not only
failed to consider the statute similar in scope to 27-2-7(22),
but also lacked a ruling as to the constitutionality of any
legislation; authorities need· hardly be cited to buttress
the statement that a court will not pass upon the constitutionality of specific legislation unless the question is
brought directly before it and unless it is necessary for the
determination of the litigant's.right in the matter pending.
State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94 P.2d 414; Wright v. Lee~
101 Utah 76, 118 P.2d 132; Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v.
The Arkansas Department of Public Utiliti-es, 58 S. Ct. 770,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
304 U.S. 61, 82 L.Ed. 1149; Spector Motor Service v. Mc.Laughlin, 65 S. Ct. 152, 323 U.S. 101, 89 L.Ed. 101.
Additional cases mentioned in the main opinion of this
Court, New York Tunnel Authority v. Consolidated Edison
Co., 295 N.Y. 467, 68 N.E.2d 445 (N.Y. 1946); Transit Commission v. Long Island Railroad Co., 253 N.Y. 345, 171 N.E.
565, while seemingly supporting the theory that the universal common law may be modified by a properly drawn
statute, do not mention or pass upon the validity of such
legislation in the light of constitutional provisions analagous to Art. VI, Sec. 31 of the Utah Constitution. Consequently they are of no precedent in the case at bar.
Further, the New York Court in Westchester Electric
Railroad Co. v. Westchester County Park Commission, 255
N.Y. 297, 174 N.E. 660 (cited in the majority opinion), devotes no attention to the validity of a statute authorizing
reimbursement to utilities when subject to constitutional
attack; stretched to the fartherest point the decision stands
for nothing more than the fact that a statute was enacted
prescribing payment for relocation costs.
It is thus seen beyond doubt that the cases mentioned
in the preceding paragraphs when scrutinized for the
questions of law raised therein and the conclusions of law
resulting therefrom, stand in the darkness of inapplicability, and if it be the conclusion of this Court that the determination of the instant case is predicated upon the
counting of decisions, as evidenced by the language of the
main opinion, then we respectfully submit and petition
that the court exclude those decisions which fall short of
any constitutional issues and those in which the constitution of the respective jurisdiction fails to contain a prohi-
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bition ,on a ·comparable basis ·with,·Art. VI, Sec. 31. 'T·he
decisions in Tennessee (State of Tennessee v. Southern Bell
Telephone Co., supra), Texas (State of Texas v. The City
of Austin and the City of Dallas, -S.W.2d-), New Mexico
(State l-Iighway Commission of New Mexico v. Southern
Union Gas Company, supra), Minnesota (Minneapolis Gas
Co. v. Zimmerman, 91 N.W.2d 642), and Idaho (State of
Idaho v. Idaho Power Co. and Mountain States Telephone
and Telegraph Co., supra), which test statutes similar in

scope to 27-2-7(22) under constitutional provisions analagous with the pertinent sections of the Utah Constitution,
are to be considered. The case of Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. The State Highway Commissioner of North
Dakota, Supreme Court No. 7856, -N.W.2d- ·(March

1960) merits special comment, however, for the holding is
unlike its companion cases in the five other jurisdictions.
The Constitution of North Dakota, Section 185, provides in
part:
"The state, any county or city may make internal
improvements and may engage in any industry,
enterprise, or business, not prohibited. by Article
30 of the Constitution, but neither the state nor
any political subdivision thereof shall otherwise
loan or give its credit or make donations to or in
aid to any individual, association or corporation

* **"
The North Dakota Court held that the State may make
internal improvements, that public financing of a privately owned corporation in relocating its facilities on the public right-of-way qualified as an internal improvement, that
the subsequent clause prohibiting the State or any political
subdivision from loaning or giving -its credits i,n aid of any
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individual or corpora ton acted by way of limitation, and did
not restrict the capacity of the State to make internal improvements even though such improvements might otherwise be classed as a gift of public funds. The effect of the
North Dakota decision is to admit that the payment of
relocation costs by the Highway Department might be
considered a gift of public funds, the question being of no
concern, because Section 185 permits of such disbursement. The Court declared:
"For the reasons set forth it is of no concern to
this court whether Section 24-0141 of the 1957 supplement to N.D.R.C. 1943 [Utility Relocation Act]
does or does not provide for a donation or an extension of credit.''
The language of the North Dakota decision, therefore, excludes itself from presently being considered.
The Tennessee, New Mexico and Idaho decisions,
supra, leave nothing unturned in their interpretation of
the "lending of credit" section of the Constitution and definition of public use. To come within the confines of the
Constitution, the Tennessee court had this to say:
"The expenditure [to pass the test of public use]
must be for a state purpose, which function the
state performs for its general public, agencies and
instrumentalities of the state for the accomplishment of a state purpose under state control; and
the state must have the * * * right of use * * *
of the property upon which the fund its expended.

*

**

The basic test under this section of our Constitution is whether the expenditure is for a state purpose. In the present case the primary purpose
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served by the expenditure is for the convenience
and benefit of the utilities, the purpose cannot be
public."
·
·
We petition and urge upon the Court that the expenditures contemplated by Section 27-2-7(22) serve no public
purpose; once the disbursement has been effectuated, control and use of the donation thereafter rests solely with
the utility and is next represented in the annual profit and
loss statement of the company. It is well to exercise the
great equitable powers of the Court in a situation where
equity is justified, but this is not such a situation. The use
of the public right-of-way by the respondents was and is
permissive in the first and initial instance; they placed
the facilities on the highway knowing full well that the
obligation to remove and relocate was on their shoulders,
notwithstanding the financial consequences of so doing;
if resort to equitable powers be proper in this instance,
then it would be correct to say that the Legislature may
properly aid and finance all individuals who are required
to expend funds to establish business facilities. We would
urge that the facts of the immediate case are not within
the purview of Oswego v. Syracuse Railroad Co., 226 N.Y.
351, 124 N.E. 8 (quoted in the main opinion) for the use
therein by the railroad of its bridge spanning the canal was
not consensual or permissive in nature, the structure having abutted on railroad right-of-way on each side of the
canal. The process of enlarging the width of the canal
necessitated the relocation of the bridge facility and it was
on this sole basis that Oswego was decided. The present
case is allied neither factually nor legally with Oswego v.
Syracuse Railroad Co., supra, and for this reason_we would

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17

urge that the principles of equity expounded therein are
inappropriate here.
The fact that the purpose behind the gift is in some
respects commendable cannot of itself invoke the powers
of equity. As was proclaimed in State Highway Commission of New Mexico v. Southern Union Gas Company,

supra.

* That the legislature has the power to be
equitable and just we may admit, but that power
is restricted by the Constitution. Otherwise the
prohibition against a donation would have no meaning or effect. As stated in State ex rel. Sena v.
Trujillo (46 N.M. 361, 129 P2d 333) 'the constitution makes no distinction as between "donations,"
whether they be for a good cause or a questionable
one. It prohibits them all * * * .' "
"* *

The New Mexico Supreme Court provided a ready answer
to the question of whether a utility, in placing its facilities
on public right of way, acts in the public interest. It stated:

"* * * The line is the property of the utility and to
be used solely by it, neither the state nor the public
having any right to use these lines. * * *"
The New Mexico Court made, what we respectfully urge
to be the correct analysis of the utilities' position and
function in society, in saying:

"* * * The Southern Union Gas Company is not
a subordinate governmental agency nor is it fulfilling a governmental function although it is serving
a highly useful purpose in the great American free
enterprise tradition by furnishing for profit an essential commodity to the people of this state." (Emphasis added.)
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In State of Idaho v. The Idaho Power Co. and Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., supra, the court,
after having made what may be the most exhaustive analysis thus far rendered by any judiciary passing on the question, distinguished the profit-making purposes of a utility,
its ultimate aim, from the type of service rendered:
''The fact that respondents' activities, in furnishing
services to the public, are public in nature and may
be devoted to public use is insufficient to remove
payment of the relocation costs from the constitutional prohibitions. The state has not acquired and
cannot acquire the property of any privately owned
utility, as are respondents, or any interest therein;
nor any control over respondents or their officers,
except in certain limited aspects through the public
utilities commission; nor does the state direct the
acquisition and disposition of propertes, or control
the financial transactions of privately owned utilities; nor is the property owned by such utilities,
public property exempt from taxation as provided
by Idaho Const., Art. 7, Sec. 4; and whereas, such
utilities may, and do, use their moneys and properties for profit, the state and its political subdivisions are prohibited from making a profit directly
or indirectly by the use of public moneys, Idaho
Const., Art. 7, Sec. 10. Nor is any grant authorized
in favor of any utility, of a vested or permanent interest in any public thoroughfare, the right to the
use being permissive and as not to incommode the
public use thereof."
If the respondents may be reimbursed for removing their
facilities from a locale formerly utilized only with the consent of the State of Utah, would it not also then be constitutionally proper to pay and finance P.I.E. Freightways
and other commercial hauling companies for costs that
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might be incurred in being forced to use a detour of several
·:
'

.

hundred miles during the construction or reconstruction
of a state arterial highway. Commercial trucking is most
certainly one of the purposes for which modern highways
are utilized, although such use is permissive in nature. and
subject to the reasonable exercise of the police power; or
it might be persuasively argued hereinafter that the state
should finance and pay for the cost of laying transmission
gas lines and pipe into an area previo'usly unserviced on
the theory that this would be beneficial to the populace in
such area. The possible ramifications of such a holding are
untold in nature and number.

Realities of the Situation. It has been suggested by
respondents and noted by this Court in the major opinion
that refusal to recognize constitutional validity would impose unjustified burdens on utility consumers in those jurisdictions wherein relocation costs were not satisfied by the
Bureau of Public Roads-that, in effect, it would force the
utility user to pay twice (once at the gas pumps and again
at the utility office). From the viewpoint of applying the
mandate of the Constitution, the argument is hardly worth
comment. The conclusion is obvious that a customer of
the respondents has no interest in the properties of the
utilities and the fact that relocation costs are requisite does
no affect his position. (The record in this case is silent in
respect to one instance where utility costs have increased
by reason of relocation expenditures.) Then too, in the
United States, only thirteen of fifty states possess legislation providing for subsidization of utilities for relocaton
expenses, so that residents of Utah find themselves in a
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status no different than the utility customers iii thirtyseven other jurisdictions.
One "reality" which faces residents of Utah is that
this state is allocated a proportion of the amount of allotted federal funds for highway purposes and the reduction in the amount of funds available for right-of-way
acquisition and road construction simply means that fewer
miles ·of freeways and highways will be built. We would
submit that of the two "realities" mentioned, the latter is

in the more critical class.
'

Wallberg v. The Utah Public Welfare Commission,
115 Utah 242, 203 P.2d 935, has been cited as authority that
a moral obligation of the state may be recognized. This
petitioner would allege that Wall berg involved not a donation or gift of public moneys, for the statute under consideration created a lien on the recipient's -real property, and
a receipt of any public disbursements was conditioned upon
the pledge of all real property interests as security for
later reimbursement by the pledgor. Justice Wade in his
concurring opinion, hit the mark when he said:

"* * * in my opinion the Public Assistance Act of
1947, as amended in 1948, creates an obligation
against the estate of every recipient to repay the
total amount of public assistance received by him
during his lifetime.

***
"The above quoted paragraph, definitely requires
the repayment of all assistance received, the same
as other claims in the course of administration of
the estate of every recipient. * * *

***
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"I therefore conclude that the intention of the legislature in enacting that paragraph was to make
all assistance given to any recipient payable after
his death under the provisions of subdivision (5),
of Section 102-9-22, U.C.A. 1943, the same as other
claims in the course of the administration of the
estate." (E.mphasis added)
The Constitution of this state stands supreme in the
final accounting of our social order and is not subject to
the wavering tides of local opinion. As declared in Judd
v. Board of Education, 15 N.E.2d 576, 118 ALR 789 (N.Y.
App.):
"A written constitution is not only the direct and
basic expression of the soverign will, but it is the
absolute rule of action and decision for all departments and offices of government in respect to all
matters covered by it, and must control as it is
written until it shall be changed by the authority
that established it. * * * When that sovereign will
has been clearly expressed, it is the duty of the
courts rigidly to enforce it. It is not the province
of the courts to circumvent it because of private notions of justice or because of personal
inclinations. * * *"
This Court, in Moon Lake Electric Association and
Uintah Basin Telephone Association v. Utah State Tax
Commission, 9 U.2d 384, 345 P.2d 612, stated the law to be:

"* * *

Where, however, the mind is convinced of
the unconstitutionality of the law, the duty which
devolves upon the court to declare it so is impeTative, even where, as in this case, the statute appears
to be in consonance with justice and humanity.
That the law itself would be beneficient can be of
no avail in this case, because its effect and operation
would be to exempt property, against the mandate
of the fundamental law."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22

It is the fond desire of ·this petitioner not to burden
the Court with materials discussed on original appeal. It
it our feeling, however, that the gravity of this question
merits reconsideration, and we respectfully urge and petition this Court to rehear argument on the constitutionality of 27-2-7(22). The Highway Fund of this State can ill
afford the loss of moneys desperately needed for construction and completion of the highway system throughout the
State of Utah.
POINT II
THE PERMISSIVE USE OF THE PUBLIC
HIGHWAY RIGHT-OF-WAY BY THE UTILITY IN EMPLACING ITS FACILITIES THERE01\J DOES NOT VEST IN IT A PROPERTY
RIGHT OF ANY NATURE.
The respondents in this case have maintained their
facilities in the past on public right-of-way solely on the
basis of franchise agreements entered into by and between
them, respectively, and the State of Utah. The utilities'
presence on the highway exists not as of right but as the
result of the consent of the State or other political subdivision thereof. If the State of Utah deems it in the public
interest to exclude utility facilities from the public rightof-way in order to facilitate the safe flow of vehicular traffic, it may do so as a proper adjunct of the police power.
The broad and sweeping language of the major opinion in
the instant case might indicate a contrary result, wherein
it was said:

"* * *We subscribe to the doctrine that the utilities
are at horne on the public highways; * * * public
welfare demands that the people be served with
water, sewer systems, electricity, gas, telephone and
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telegraph, as well as transportation. and ineans of
travel. * * * It is impossible to meet these urgent
requirements without making use of the· public
property." Emphasis Added.
While it may be observed that this statement of the court
constitutes dicta of sorts, the consequences of such, from
the viewpoint of the State Road Commission, are far reaching, with the probability of future litigation resulting
therefrom. If the premise derived from this language is to
give the respondents a property interest in the public
highway and, further, a right to be on the public right-ofway, then we would respectfully. urge this statement to be
in error and we hereby petition the Court to modify and/or
clarify its intended meaning.
The law has been consistent that a utility acquires no
property right in the public right-of-way by its utilization
for he operation of its facilities. Thus it was ~aid in Delaware River v. The Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission, 145 A.2d 172:
''Historically in Pennsylvania non-transportation
public utilities have been permitted to occupy highway rights-of-way free of cost, subject to the police
power to control and regulate the high\vays for
public bene-fit. Such utilities obtain no property
rights in the highway. * * *"
See also Delaware River Port Authority v. Pennsylvania
Public Utilities Commission, 199 A.2d 85·5; Transit C,ommission v. Long Island Railroad Co., 253 N.Y. 345, 171 N.E.
565; New York Tunnel Authority v. Consolidated Edison
Co., 295 N.Y. 467, 68 N.E.2d 445; New Orleans Gaslight Co.
v. Drainage Commission of New Orlea.ns, 197 U.S. 453, 25
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S. Ct. 471, 49 L.Ed. 831; State of Idaho v. Idaho Power Co.
and Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co.,
-Ida.-, 346 P.2d 596; State Highway Commission of New
Mexico v. The Southern Union Gas Co., 65 N. Mex. 84, 332
P.2d 1007.
The United States Supreme Court in the New Orleans
Gaslight Co. case put it this way:

"* * * In the very terms of the grant there is a
. recognition that the use of the streets by the gas
company was to be in such manner as to least inconvenience the city in the use thereof. Except that
the privilege was conferred to use the streets * * *
there was nothing in the terms of the grant to indictate the intention of the state to give up its control of the public streets, * * *." (Emphasis added)
The franchises submitted into evidence and before this
Court indicate and specifically set forth that each of the
respondents occupy the right-of-way as a privilege and
license, the natural implication therefrom being that no
right is existent to occupy and possess any part of such
right-of-way.
The statement of the Court, as quoted above, on its
face, would seem to lend credit to the assertion in Respondents' original brief that their use of the public rightof-way is by way of an easement and qualifies as a vested
property right. If such use was classified as an easement
or other vested property interest, then quite naturally, the
State of Utah, in order to acquire the interest in furtherance
of its road building program, would be dependent upon
the inherent power of eminent domain, 78-34-1 et seq,
UCA 1953. The quick answer to this problem is, of course,
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that the exercise of the State's power to condemn is not
necessary, for the soverign's request of the utilities to relocate their facilities does not involve a taking within the
scope of the statutes. New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage
Commission of New Orleans, 197 U.S. 453, 25 S. Ct. 471, 49
L.Ed. 831; Atlantic Coast LineR. Co. v. City of Goldsboro,
232 U.S. 548, 34 S. Ct. 364, 58 L.Ed. 721; State of Idaho v.
Idaho Power Co. and Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., -Ida.-, 346 P.2d 596. The use of the police
power rather than the power of eminent domain sepa~ates
permissive and revocable uses of property from vested
property interests.
In order that this Petitioner might avoid future litigation and administrative indecision in the control and
operation of the state highway system, we earnestly and
respectfully request this Court to clarify the remark that
the utility is at "home on the public highways."
POINT III
NEITHER THE UTILITY RELOCATION ACT
NOR THE DECISION AS RENDERED IMPOSES
AN OBLIGATION UPON THE STATE ROAD
COMMISSION TO REIMBURSE RELOCATION
COSTS IN CONTRAVENTI ON OF THE SPECIFIC TERMS OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UTILITY AND THE STATE ROAD
COMMISSION.

It is conceded that the common law required utilities
to pay the entire cost of removing and relocating any facilities located within the right-of-way of a public highway
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manded. (See Decision, Advance Green Sheet, p. 2.) This
Court now takes the position that the Legislature may.
change this common law rule prospectively, lift the cost
burden from the utilities and impose it upon the State.
(Decision, supra, p. 2.) This court is not impressed with
the theory that the common law as it exists when a franchise is granted becomes an integral part of the franchise,
impervious to future modification by the Legislature. (Decision, supra, p. 7.)
Though we insist there is good and sufficient authority of historical sanction to the contrary (see Sturges v.
Crowninshield, 4 Whet 122, L.Ed. 5·29; Home Building
and Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 88 A.L.R. 1481),
it is not our purpose here to argue the clear ruling of the
Court regarding integration of the common law and abroa
gation of same. We do wish to urge the discussion, however, of certain issues which have survived the Court's
decision and certain issues which have arisen since the
Court's decision.
It appears obvious that the Court's decision deals only
with the question: May the Legislature abrogate the common law? The Court says nothing as to whether or not the
Legislature may shift the relocation burden to the State
where by written agreement the utility has previously
agreed to assume the burden. The Court specifically ackowledges and calls attention to the fact that the franchises
involved in the instant lawsuit are silent as to any removal
or relocation of facilities. (Decision, supra, p. 1.)
As the Court states:

"* * * the question to be answered is whether or
not the Legislature has the power to modify the
common law, prospectively * * *." Decision, p. 2.)
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After answering this question in the affirmative the Court
then states:
"The theory that the common law rule as it existed
when the franchises were granted became an integral part of the franchises as if expressly written
therein * * * is not supported by the authorities."
(Emphasis added) (Decision, p. 7.)
Thus the Court clearly distinguishes the instant case and
its holding from a situation where the relocation obligation
is expressly written in the franchise.
The Court is careful to explain that in the case of unwritten provisions the obligation of same does not come
intO· existence until some circumstance prompts the imposition of same. For example, in the instant case, even
though the unwritten or common law imposed relocation
costs on the utility, since nothing was specifically said
concerning the same in the franchise agreement, there was
no relocation obligation or liability until relocation was
requested. Therefore, as stated by the Court, the Utility
Relocation Act does not nullify any existing obligation in
connection with the franchises involved because no obligation existed at the time the Act was passed.
Obviously if the parties had expressly agreed as to
relocation in the franchise this would create an existing
obligation or liability at the time the franchise was executed regardless of when the relocaton was actually ordered.
Whether the obligation of a written agreement is executed
or executory does not effect the binding nature of the obligation. In the landmark case of Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch
87, 3 L.Ed. 162, 1810, Chief Justice Marshall, after defining
a land grant as a contract, went on to discuss this point
as follows:
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"A contra.ct is a compact between two or more parties, and is "either executory or· executed. * * * A
contract executed, as well as one which is execu·tory, contains obligations binding on the parties.
* * * Since then, in fact, a grant is a contract executed, the obligation of which still continues, and
since the Constitution uses the general term contract, without distinguishing between those which
are executory and those which are executed, it must
be construed to comprehend the latter as well as
the former.'~
Chief Justice Marshall then went on to conclude that
the State of Georgia was restrained, either by general principles which are common to our free institutions, or by
the particular provisions of the Constitution of the United
States, from passing a law impairing the obligation of a
previous land contract.
To the argument that the State could impair contract
when the State itself was one of the contracting parties,
Chief Justice Marshall had this to say:
"If, under a fair construction of the Constitution,
grants are comprehended under the term contracts,
is a grant from the state excluded fro1n the operation of the provision? Is the clause to be considered
as inhibiting the state from impairing the obligation
of contracts between t-vvo individuals, but as excluding from that inhibition contracts made with itself?
The words themselves contain no such distinction.
They are general, and are applicable to contracts of
every description. * * * What motive, then, for implying, in words which import a general prohibition
to impair the obligation of contracts, an exception
in favor of the right to impair the obligation of
those contracts into which the state may enter.
* * * The court can perceive no sufficient grounds
for making that distinction.''
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The protection due "executory" interests was further
defined in the case of Piqua Branch of State Bank of Ohio
v. Knoop, 16 How. 369, 14 L.Ed. 977, (1853). In this case
the State of Ohio attempted to impair tax advantage, granted to certain banks in previous legislation, by a subsequent
statute. The Supreme Court held that the State of Ohio,
"Having power to make the contract, and rights becoming
vested under it, it can no more be disregarded nor set aside
by a subsequent legislature, than a grant for land.''' Textbook writers classify that type of statute which attempts
to impair a previously existing obligation. as a retroactive
law and the general rule in relation thereto is stated by
Willis as follows:
"Retroactive laws may not violate obligation of
contract." (Willis, Constitutional Law, 1936, p. 377.)
Stated in another way:
"Generally a retrospective statute affecting vested
rights is invalid, and all retrospective statutes are
strictly construed for courts have assumed that they
generally operate unfairly."
(Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed. Sec.
3102.)
It is true that the courts have carved out an exception to the retrospective rule where the State is reasonably
exercising its police power:
"*

* * the state power may be addressed directly

to the prevention of the enforcement of contracts
only when these are of a sort which the Legislature
in its discretion may denounce as being in themselves hostile to public morals, or public health,
safety, or welfare, or where the prohibition is merely of injurious practices; * * * interference with
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the enforcement of other and valid contracts according to appropriate legal procedure, although
the interference is temporary and for a public purpose, is not permissable."
(Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, supra.)
It is difficult to find in the instant case, however, that a
statute providing for the payment of relocation costs is in
the interest of public morals, health, safety or welfare. An
order of relocation is an obvious exercise of the police
power-payment of an invoice for the cost of relocation
is obviously not an exercise of the police power. When the
State pays a relocation invoice in contravention of a written agreement by the utility, it does more than exercise the
police power to regulate without compensation-it commits an ultra virus, unconstitutional act by retroactively
impairing the obligation of a legal contract.
We submit tne instant decision stands only for the
proposition that in any case of a relocation from public
right-of-way ordered by the State Road Commission on
or after May_ 14, 1957, the Road Commission, so long as
the Federal Government by law will participate and so
long as the parties have said nothing in writing to the
contrary, must pay the relocation costs.
POINT IV
THE UTILITY RELOCATION ACT SPECIFICALLY PROTECTS THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACT AND ABSOLVES THE STATE ROAD
C 0 M M I S S I 0 N FROM RELOCATION COSTS
WHERE BY WRITING, SUCH OBLIGATION
HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN ASSUMED BY THE
UTILITY.
Actually, this Court had no other alternative under
the statutes involved than to recognize a distinction be-
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tween written and unwritten provisions in the application
of the Utility Relocation Act to existing obligations.
Under the Utility Relocation Act the Road Commission to pay relocation costs only,

* * in

all cases where proportionate remibursement of such costs may be obtained by the State of
Utah from the United States pursuant to the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956.''
"*

(Section 27-2-7(22) (a), U.C.A. 1953, supra.)
The Road Commission's obligation to pay relocation
costs applies, therefore, only to those situations where the
Federal Government will participate. U·nder the Federal
Highway Act:

"* * *

F1ederal funds shall not be used to reimburse the State under this section when the payment to the utility violates the law of the State or
violates a legal contract between the utility and
the State."
(23 U.S.C., Section 123, supra.)
If the utility occupies the public right-of-way under
franchise or other written agreement executed by competent parties without fraud or duress, there exists a legal
contract. The Federal Government will not reimburse relocation costs if to do so would violate such a contract. Our
State Legislature has intended and so stated that the Road
Commission must not pay relocation costs where the Federal Government will not reimburse. Both the Federal Act
and the State Act must be read in pari materia and when
so read the conclusion is inescapable: Where a legal contract exists between the utility and the State under which
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the utility has specifically assumed relocation costs ·the
Federal ·Government will not reimburse, and the Road
Commission cannot pay.
Our Legislature did not intend nor did it say that
henceforth and forever in all situations the State must pay
relocation costs. It did not intend to create a new rule of
substantive law nor did it intend to abrogate existing written contracts. To the contrary, the Federal and State Acts
combine to specifically protect the obligation of written
agreements between the utility and the State. Our Legislature merely carved out an exception to the common law
rule regarding relocation costs and provided that so long
as the Federal Government will participate the State will
pay such costs. This Court then limits the application of
the Act to prospective requests for relocation where the
parties have been silent concerning the relocation
obligation.
It has been assumed that the respondents likewise
understood the distinction in this matter between situations involving a previously executed written agreement
and situations where the parties had been silent. It is the
statement of the respondents that:
"The question before this Court thus concerns the
validity of provisions of the substantive law, enacted by the Legislature in the exercise of the police
power of the State. Its effect is clearly limited to
relocations ordered by the Commission after the
effective date of the Act. It does not purport to
release any oblgations which utilities may have had
in connection with past relocations of facilities."
(Brief of Respondents, p. 9.)
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However, since the Court's decision herein, the respondents have demanded reimbursement for all relocations
ordered after May 14, 1957, regardless of the terms of the
writing under which the utility occupied the premises. For
this reason petitioner requests clarification and restatement of the Court's postion.
POINT V
THE UTILITY RELOCATION ACT IS, BY ITS
VERY TERMS, DEVISABLE AND THE PROVISO
REGARDING RELOCATION COSTS DOES NOT
QUALIFY OR EFFECT THE PLENARY POWER.
GRANTED TO THE ROAD COMIVIISSION
TO REGULATE, CONTROL AND RELOCATE
FACILITIES LOCATED ON A PUBLIC RIGHTOF-WAY.
It must be remembered that the cost of relocation
phrase of the Utility Relocation Act was inserted by way
of proviso. The general enactment was for the purpose of
granting to the Road Commission the power "* * * to
make reasonable regulations for the * * * relocation of all
facilities * * * of any utility. Whenever the Commission
shall determine that any such facilities * * * should be
relocated, the utility * * * owning or operating such facilities shall relocate the same in accordance with the order
of the Commission; * * *. ''
(27-2-7(22) (a), U.C.A. 1953, supra.)
Respondent would have us believe that the sole purpose of the Utility Relocation Act is to rectify an allegedly
unfair sjtuation and provide for the payment of relocation
costs. We would suggest to the contrary that the primary
purpose of the Act was to indicate, without equivocation,
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the right of the Road Commission on Federal Aid projects
to regulate and relocate utilities. The cost proviso was, we
think, misused by the Legislature to introduce independent legislation. In any event it is clear that the cost proviso
is separable and devisable from the general enactment and
in application does no more than burden the general power of relocation with a cost obligation under certain
circumstances.
The cost proviso must be strictly construed and closely guarded in its application.
"As in all other cases, a proviso should be interpreted consistently with the legislative intent. Where
the proviso itself must be considered in an attempt
to determine the intent of the legislature, it should
be strictly construed. This is true because the legislative purpose set forth in the general enactment
expresses the legislative policy and only those subjects expressly exempted by the proviso should be
freed from the operation of the statute."
(Sutherland, supra, Section 4933.)
Not only is the cost proviso limited as to application,
it is by its terms limited as to duration. Its life span is
limited to the life span of the Federal Highway Act of
1956 and is coextensive therewith. When the Federal Highway Act expires or is sooner terminated, any relocation
cost obligation on Federal aid projects will cease. By contrast the relocation power granted by the State statute is
to apply to:

"* * * any project on the federal aid primary or
secondary system of highways as the same now are
or may hereafter be defined by Act of Congress, or
on the interstate system, as herein defined, including extension thereof within urban areas."
(Section 27-2-7(22) (a), U.C.A., supra.)
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The petitioner envisions that long after the Federal Highway Act of 1956 expires relocations in connection with
federal aid projects will continue.
By no stretch of imagination did the cost proviso of
the Utility Relocation Act suddenly grant new property
or contractual rights to the utilities in connection with
federal aid highways. The obligation to relocate from the
path of federal aid projects on order of the Commission is
mandatory. The cost proviso is directory. The power of
the Road Commission to regulate the use of its rights of
way by a utility is plenary and complete. Since the decision
of this Court has apparently suggested a different conclusion to the utilities, and an issue in this regard persists,
clarification and restatement of the Court's position is
appropriate.
POINT VI
THE PERMISSIVE USE GRANTED TO A UTILITY OF THE PUBLIC HIGHWAYS DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE A USE AS NECESSARY AND
INDISPENSABLE AS THE USE OF SUCH
HIGHWAY AS A MEDIUM FOR VEHICULAR
TRAFFIC.
We call the Court's attention to the statement found
in the main opinion herein:

"* * * the presence of the utility facilities on the
streets constitutes a use as indispensable as the use
for travel, * * *."
This observation is both unique and surprising to the extent that not even the respondents herein have contended
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that Congress, under the Federal Highway Act of 1956,
and the Utah Legislature, under present and projected road
building programs, laid as their primary basis for the construction of highways, freeways and expressways the housing of privately owned utility facilities. It takes not an
expe-rt to realize the real need and necessity for highly
designed road beds in order to take care of present and
future day vehicular traffic, intrastate and interstate.
The Legislature of the State of Utah defines public
highway at 27-1-1, U.C.A._ 1953. The plain meaning of this
statute suggests that the primary purpose of a highway
is to facilitate the movement of vehicles from one point
to another.
A permissive occupation of the respondents and of
privately ovvned utilities in general in no measure pr~
voked the passage of the 1956 Federal Highway Act; rather, it was the forecast of the Congress for the requirement
of transportation facilities to accommodate the great influx
of vehicular traffic within the next 13 years that brought
about the legislation.
This fact is pointedly illustrated by the Declaration
of Policy of the United States Congress found in Section
101 (b), Title 23, U .S.C.:
"It is hereby declared to be in the national interest
to accelerate the construction of the Federal Aid
Highway Systems, including the National System
of Interstate and Defense Highways, since many of
such highways or portions thereof, are in fact inadequate to meet the needs of local and interstate commerce, for the national and civil defense.
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"It is hereby declared that the prompt and early
completion of the National System of Interstate and
Defense Highways, so named because of its· primary importance to the national defense and
hereafter referred to as the 'Interstate System' is
essential to the national interest and is one of the
most important objectives of this Act. It is the intent of Congress that the Interstate System shall
be completed as nearly as practicable over the per.iod of availability of the 13 years appropriations
authorized for the purpose of expediting its construction, reconstruction or improvement, * * *"
Public Law, 85-767, August 27, 1958, 72 Stat. 885.
(Emp.hasis added)
It is sufficient to say that in the present age when the expeditious transfer of motor vehicle traffic is at a premium
and the movement of goods, individuals and commerce in
general is a foremost public concern, the usage of property
for such traffic and travel has no parallel when compared
with incidental usage by the respondents.
The above quoted statement of the Court, although
not essential to its decision on the merits of the questions
before it, has placed the State Road Commission in a position where the future projection of highway construction
and reconstruction is in serious jeopardy, due to the continuing and increasing necessity to negotiate with the
respondents and other privately owned utilities to locate
and place their facilities on the public highway; on this
ground, we would therefore urge and respectfully petition
this Court to reconsider the above mentioned sentence in
the light of the obvious, and to alter it by way of clarification or by striking it in its entirety from the majority
opinion.
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CONCLUSION

The Petition for Rehearing submitted by this petitioner should, based on the points and issues of law raised
herein, be accepted and granted by this Court and the
Court should reconsider its former opinion and specific
parts thereof and rehear arguments on the merits of the
constitutionality of Section 27-2-7(22), U.C.A. 1953, as
amended, in light of the constitutional questions of law
raised.
Additionally, or in the alternative, this Court should
clarify and explain the meaning it attributes to the language used in the main opinion with specific reference to
the questions and argument raised by this petitioner in
Points II, III, IV, V, and VI herein.
Respectfully submitted,
WALTER L. BUDGE

Attorney General
ROBERTS. CAMPBELL, JR.
F'RANKLYN B. MATHESON

Assistant Attorneys General
Attorneys for Petitioner
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